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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
v. 
GERALD DOUG FRIDLEIFSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010392-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree 
or capital felony. Appellant Gerald Fridleifson was convicted of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third-degree-felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998). A copy of the judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in 
denying Fridleifson's motion to suppress evidence, where officers engaged in a level two 
seizure without reasonable articulable suspicion. 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard is bifurcated. "The factual findings 
of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.n State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
App. 1991); Salt Lake City v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, f 8, 998 P.2d 274. The trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, where "the appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogated in part bv Campbell v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.. Co., 2001 UT 89, ^ fl3, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Fridleifson's request for suppression of the evidence was preserved in the record 
(,fR.,f) at 17-19, 26-48,197, and the trial court ruled on the matter at R. 49-55 and 65-67. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal: U.S. 
Constitution, amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999). The text of those provisions 
is contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On February 12, 1999, the state charged Fridleifson with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third-degree-felony offense. (R. 2-3.) On May 5, 1999, Fridleif-
son filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during an unlawful detention. (R. 17-
18.) On May 17, 1999, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, wherein the 
state called Matt Larson to testify, and the defense called Fridleifson. (R. 20-21, 197.) 
On July 21,1999, the trial court issued a written memorandum decision in the 
2 
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matter, denying the motion to suppress (a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 
C), and on August 19, the court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (a copy 
of the Findings and Conclusions is attached hereto as Addendum D).1 
On January 11, 2000, a two-day jury trial commenced in the matter. (R. 102-03, 
125-27.) At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Fridleifson guilty as charged (R. 150), 
and on April 13, 2001, the trial judge sentenced Fridleifson to an indeterminate prison 
term not to exceed five years. The trial judge suspended the prison term and ordered 
Fridleifson to serve a jail sentence and 6 months probation. (See Addendum A, hereto.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 17, 1999, a motion to suppress hearing was held in the above-entitled 
case. During the hearing, the state presented the following evidence. 
On January 11, 1999, Officers Matt Larson and James Washington were in the 
area of 342 South Post Street, Salt Lake, on the suspicion that an apartment at that address 
was a "drug house." (R. 197:4-5.) Larson and Washington kept surveillance on the 
apartment from an alley. (R. 197:5.) 
According to Larson, he had prior dealings with the suspect residence. In the 
months preceding the events in this case, he made three to five arrests of persons coming 
out of the house. (R. 197:5-6, 10.) Larson could not say whether each of the arrested 
1 On July 30, 1999, the defense filed a motion to reconsider. (R. 58-60.) The trial court 
denied that motion and ruled that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law would 
"continue to stand in this matter in relation to the Motion to Suppress." (R. 74-75.) 
3 
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persons bought drugs at the apartment, "but some [] of them did." (R. 197:13.) Larson 
also disclosed that at some point, he attempted to secure a warrant for the residence, but 
was unsuccessful (R. 197:13), and the occupants eventually moved out. (R. 197:14.) 
On January 11, 1999, Larson and Washington were "monitoring the short[] stay 
traffic" at the Post Street residence. (R. 197:6.) They observed four people go in or out 
of the house, and the persons stayed around "five minutes, usually less." (R. 197:6.) 
At approximately 2:00 or 3:00 in the afternoon, the officers arrested a person who 
had been inside the apartment. During the arrest, the officers observed Fridleifson in the 
area. The officers told Fridleifson they "were investigating drug activity there and that if 
he was there to purchase drugs now would be probably a good time for him to leave." 
Officer Larson believed Fridleifson said "thank you," and he left. (R. 197:7-8.) 
Later that night, the officers saw Fridleifson again in the area. It was dark and they 
were watching the residence from a nearby alley. (R. 197:8.) The officers watched 
Fridleifson walk down the stairwell, but they could not see from their position whether 
Fridleifson made contact with anyone at the apartment or even went inside. 
According to Larson, Fridleifson "came back out" from the stairwell "less than five 
minutes later." (R. 197:8, 26.) Larson testified that Fridleifson was not breaking any 
laws. (R. 197:26.) As Fridleifson walked toward his truck, the officers began to 
approach him. Larson could not say whether Fridleifson knew that the officers were 
there. (R. 197:27.) 
4 
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When Fridleifson got to the truck, he began to walk around to the driver's side. At 
that point, as he continued to make his way around the truck, Washington stated, "we 
need to talk to you, can we talk to you?" (R. 197:50-52; 197:8; 197:28-33; 197:37-38 
(when Fridleifson got to the truck, he turned to approach the driver's side door; the 
officers also continued to approach and they called out to Fridleifson, while Fridleifson 
was walking toward the officers and around the truck).)2 
Although the officers "want[ed] to be identifiable [to Fridleifson at that point] as 
police officers," (R. 197:39), Larson testified that they did not identify themselves as such 
in the dark. (R. 197:28-33.) Also, according to Larson, Fridleifson was in a position to 
acknowledge the officers, yet he did not turn around or look at them. (R. 197:27; 197:33-
34; 197:37-38; 197:41-43.) 
Indeed, Fridleifson did not "do anything" when the officers spoke to him. (R. 
197:53.) He simply "continued to walk" toward the truck. (R. 197:54.) When the pro-
secutor asked Larson whether Fridleifson "increased his pace," Larson testified that he 
did not recall "anything like that." (R. 197:54.) When the prosecutor asked that question 
a second time, Larson testified that Fridleifson "might have gone a little bit faster, but no, 
2 Larson initially testified that the officers said, "Police, we need to talk to you, or 
something to that effect. That's not an exact quote, but something like police, stop or 
police we need to talk to you." (R. 197:8; see also 197:28.) Thereafter, Larson corrected 
himself. He testified that the officers specifically did not identify themselves. They did 
not use the word "police" or anything of that nature as they approached Fridleifson. (R. 
197:28-33.) Larson ultimately testified that the officers used permissive language to 
initiate the contact, where Washington said, "[C]an we talk to you." (R. 197:50-51.) 
5 
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he wasn't running." Larson did not indicate any relevant change in Fridleifson's manner 
as he continued to the truck. (R. 197:54 (emphasis added).) 
In fact, Fridleifson did not run, he did not "appear to be startled," he did not 
"jump," and he did not act nervous. (R. 197:54.) Fridleifson simply continued to walk 
toward the truck. (R. 197:34-35; see also 197:44; 197:53-54.) 
Larson testified that because Fridleifson did not stop, the officers "approached at a 
faster pace" (R. 197:8,54,60). Larson grabbed Fridleifson (R. 197:8; 197:34; 197:44; 
197:54, 60), pushed him face-down against the truck, and said "Police, don't move." 
(See R. 197:44; 197:60.) As Fridleifson was being forced against the truck, he began to 
thrash his elbows (R. 197:44), and he threw an object that officers later found in the dirt 
and identified as a cocaine twist. (R. 197:8-9 (during the struggle Fridleifson threw a 
white object); 197:44-46; 197:59-60 (Larson pushed Fridleifson against the truck; 
Fridleifson began to thrash and threw an object).) 
Officer Larson punched Fridleifson in the mouth, placed handcuffs on him, and put 
him face-down on the ground. (R. 197:44-45; 197:47.) The officers also secured a 
passenger in Fridleifson's truck. (R. 197:47-48.)3 
3 During the motion to suppress hearing, references were made to a preliminary hearing 
transcript that was prepared by the legal defenders office. (See e.g. R. 197:1-2; 197:50.) 
There is no indication in the record that the judge relied on that transcript in ruling on the 
motion to suppress. (See record in general.) Nevertheless, Fridleifson asked this Court 
to supplement the record with the transcript in order that the state may be able to review it 
in connection with this appeal. Pursuant to the stipulated request for supplementation and 
this Court's order, the transcript is contained in the record at 199. 
6 
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After Larson testified, Fridleifson took the witness stand. He denied throwing 
anything. (R. 197:63.) Fridleifson stated that he worked on a car for a friend and went to 
the Post Street apartment to collect the money for his work. (R. 197:64.) The first time 
Fridleifson arrived at the apartment, the officers told him that if he was there to buy drugs 
he should leave. Fridleifson told the officers he was there to collect money for a job, and 
he left. (R. 197:67-68.) Later that night, after Fridleifson went back to the apartment 
and was returning to his truck, he heard someone call out, but he was not paying attention 
to the person and did not know who it was. (R. 197:69.) The officers grabbed 
Fridleifson, punched him, handcuffed him, and arrested him. (R. 197:44-47.) 
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress. The 
case went to trial and the jury convicted Fridleifson of drug possession as charged. (R. 
150.) Additional facts relating to the issue on appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
An officer may detain or seize a person for limited investigative purposes if the 
officer is able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that the person has or is engaged in 
criminal activity. If an officer observes a person in a high crime area, that is not enough 
by itself to support reasonable suspicion. 
In this case, Officers Larson and Washington observed Fridleifson on the 
afternoon of January 11, 1999, near an apartment where they were arresting a suspect, 
who had just visited the apartment. The officers suspected that individuals at the 
7 
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apartment were selling drugs. They referred to the apartment as a "known drug house." 
The officers told Fridleifson that if he was there to buy drugs, now would be a good time ( 
to leave. Fridleifson thanked the officers and left. 
Hours later, Fridleifson returned to the area and walked down the stairwell leading 
{ 
to the apartment. The officers were unable to see Fridleifson. They could not see 
whether he spoke with anyone at the apartment or whether he went inside. After 
i 
Fridleifson came back up the stairwell, the officers asked if they could talk to him. 
Fridleifson did not respond to the officers. He did not increase his pace, and he did not 
appear startled or jumpy. He simply continued about his business. 
It is unclear from the evidence whether Fridleifson would have been able to 
identify Larson and Washington in the dark as officers. < 
As Fridleifson continued to his truck, Larson rushed up to him, grabbed him, and 
pushed him against his truck. Fridleifson began to trash his elbows, and he threw an 
object that officers later retrieved and identified as a cocaine twist. 
Fridleifson was charged with drug possession. He challenged the seizure in a 
motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court was in error. The 
total circumstances in this case fail to support reasonable articulable suspicion. The 
officers were not justified in detaining Fridleifson. The evidence they discovered in < 
connection with the unlawful detention must be suppressed. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION FOR THE LEVEL-TWO DETENTION, 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
cularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme 
Court set forth an exception to the "probable cause" standard. Terry and its progeny 
permit an officer to detain a person for limited questioning if the officer is able to 
articulate objective facts to support a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed 
a crime. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22. Such a detention is identified as a level-two 
encounter, as follows: 
(1) [Under a level-one encounter] an officer may approach a citizen at [any time] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) 
[under a level-two encounter] an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion " that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) [and under a level-three 
encounter] an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (citing U. S. v. 
Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 
1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, 15 n.l (Utah Ct. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
App. 1991)), cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). The "reasonable suspicion" 
standard is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15(1999). 
The state bears the burden of proving that an officer had reasonable suspicion to 
justify a level-two encounter. See State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). 
In this case, the trial judge ruled that the state sustained its burden of proof. 
As set forth below, the trial court erred in its ruling. 
A. THE FINDINGS. THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE. AND THE DETAILED 
FACTS: THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IN PART ARE INSUPPORTABLE. 
IN ADDITION. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GIVE PROPER 
CONSIDERATION TO SPECIFIC AND PARTICULAR FACTS OF RECORD. 
In considering search and seizure issues, this Court will not disturb the trial court's 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Davis. 821 P.2d at 11. While the facts will be 
construed in the light most favorable to the findings, this Court nevertheless will "review 
the facts in detail." State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, 
denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Also, "[a] finding not supported by substantial, 
competent evidence must be rejected." State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990). 
If the evidence does not support a finding, the finding is clearly erroneous. Id. 
In this case, the trial court ruled that officers had reasonable articulable suspicion 
to justify the seizure. (R. 49-55, 65-67.) 
Fridleifson challenges the trial court ruling on the basis that the trial court's fin-
dings are insupportable in relevant part, the trial court failed to give proper consideration 
10 
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to specific and particular matters, and the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. 
To begin, the marshaled evidence fails to support the trial court's findings in 
relevant part. Where the findings are insupportable, they must be rejected. ArrovoJ96 
P.2d at 687. The findings and the marshaled evidence reflected the following: 
First, the court found that officers observed Fridleifson "behind an apartment, 
known to law enforcement as a 'known drug house.'" (R. 65 %l.) That finding 
apparently relates to the officers' first encounter with Fridleifson on January 11, 1999, 
where they observed him "in the small parking lot behind the house or to the west of the 
house." (R. 197:7.) The term "drug house" as used in this case and as set forth in the 
findings was not defined. Apparently, Officer Larson believed individuals were buying 
drugs from a resident or residents at the house. (See R. 197:6,7.) In the months 
preceding the incident in this case, Larson was involved in arresting 3 to 5 people who 
may have purchased drugs from someone at the house. (R. 197:10-13.) 
Second, the court found that officers first encountered Fridleifson while they were 
"arrest[ing] an individual inside the apartment for a drug offense." (R. 65, f2 (emphasis 
added).) According to Larson, the officers first encountered Fridleifson while they were 
involved in arresting a person outside the apartment. The officers "believed that [the] 
individual had [purchased] drugs inside the house." (R. 197:7, 23-25 (arrest was made in 
the alley after the person left the apartment).) That finding in part is inaccurate. 
Third, the trial court found that when officers first encountered Fridleifson in the 
l l 
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I 
area, they told him that if he was there to buy drugs, he should leave. Fridleifson thanked 
the officers and left. (R. 66, ]f3.) < 
Fourth, the trial court found that officers later observed Fridleifson again in the 
area. Fridleifson walked down the stairwell to the apartment. After less than five 
minutes, Fridleifson walked back up the stairs and toward his truck. (See R. 66, Tfl|4-5.) 
As Fridleifson proceeded to his truck, the officers asked if they could talk to him.4 
A 
According to the trial court findings, Fridleifson continued to the truck ffat a rapid pace." 
(See id at lfl|6-7.) The officers "then stopped the Defendant, who threw an object into the 
air, which later turned out to be a twist of cocaine." (Id. at f 8.) * 
Fridleifson takes issue with the court's characterization of the matter. Specifically, 
the marshaled evidence fails to support that after officers asked to speak with Fridleifson, < 
he continued to the truck "at a rapid pace." As further discussed below, the record lacks 
"substantial, competent evidence" (Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687) to support that finding. See 
( 
infra pages 14-15, below. Further, the trial court's findings fail to recognize that the 
officers "stopped" Fridleifson by physically grabbing him and pushing him against the 
4 
truck. (R. 197:34-35, 44.) Thereafter, Fridleifson began to trash his elbows and he threw 
an object. (R. 197:44-47.) Those facts are not in dispute. 
I 
4 The trial court found that as the officers approached Fridleifson, they "told him to 
stop." (R. 66, TJ6.) That finding is inaccurate. Larson testified that the officers used 
permissive language when they called out to Fridleifson. They said, "can we talk to you." 
(R. 197:50-51.) When Fridleifson did not respond, Larson rushed up to Fridleifson, 
grabbed him, and said, "Police, don't move." (R. 197:60.) Those facts are not in dispute. * 
12 
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Next, in a Memorandum Decision, the trial judge made additional representations 
about the facts. The additional representations are not included in the trial court's formal 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Compare R. 49-55 with 65-67; see also supra, 
note 1, herein.) Nevertheless, some of the representations warrant discussion since they 
are incorrect and they apparently served as a basis for the judge's decision in the case. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the judge determined that "defendant was first ob-
served at the house with another individual who was subsequently arrested for drug pos-
session." (R. 53.) That is insupportable. Fridleifson was not "with" any person who was 
subsequently arrested. (See generally, R. 197.) That representation must be disregarded. 
Also, the trial court determined that "when Officer Larson told the defendant to 
leave if he was there to buy drugs, the defendant responded by thanking the officer and 
leaving, all indicative that the defendant was indeed there to purchase drugs." (R. 53.) 
With that assertion, the trial court has drawn a conclusion based on the evidence. The 
conclusion is incorrect. Fridleifson was not required or compelled to explain himself to 
the officers. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999) (if the evidence supports reasonable 
suspicion, an officer may stop a person and demand an explanation of his actions). Thus, 
the fact that Fridleifson "responded by thanking the officer and leaving" simply supports 
that he did as directed by the officers. He left in order that they could complete their 
business as it related to the apartment. 
The trial court also determined that "defendant's action of going back to the house 
13 
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a second time [that day] for only a brief period conformed to the patterns of a drug 
purchase." (R. 53.) That determination is insupportable. Although Officer Larson < 
testified to the "patterns" of residential drug trafficking (R. 197:4-5), he did not indicate 
that in his experience and training, a second visit in the same day was indicative of 
criminal activity in general or a drug purchase in specific, particularly since officers 
dissuaded Fridleifson from visiting the apartment earlier while they were engaged in law 
i 
enforcement activities there. 
Since Fridleifson was discouraged by officers from going to the apartment earlier 
that day, it is reasonable that he would return after a period of time had elapsed, so that ( 
his visit would not interfere with the officers'activities. 
The trial court next determined that "defendant left the drug house [the second
 { 
time] in a hurried manner and, when police officers called out to him, [he] exhibited ner-
vous behavior and apparently attempted to flee to his truck." (R. 53.) Those representa-
tions are insupportable and they disregard the overwhelming evidence of record. 
According to Officer Larson, Fridleifson proceeded to his truck in a normal 
manner. When officers asked to speak with him, Fridleifson did not "do anything." (R. 
197:53; see also 197:33, 44, 54.) He did not increase his pace or "anything like that." He 
did not appear nervous, he did not seem jumpy, and he did not "appear to be startled." (R. < 
197:53-54.) The evidence overwhelmingly supports that Fridleifson simply continued to 
his truck without any change in his demeanor. 
14 
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In the event the trial court's determination regarding "a hurried manner," "nervous 
behavior" and an "attempt[] to flee" (R. 53) was based on Larson's statement that 
Fridleifson "might have gone a little bit faster" when officers called out (R. 197:54), such 
a determination was improper. Larson's use of the term ,fmightn expressed a "lesser 
degree of possibility," see Webster's New World College Dictionary, 912-13 (4th ed. 
1999), while his description of "a little bit faster" reflected an unwillingness to attribute 
such conduct to Fridleifson. Larson apparently used the equivocal phrase — "might have 
gone a little bit faster" — deliberately to express doubt or uncertainty, since that testimony 
was in direct conflict with Larson's earlier, repeated and clear statements that Fridleifson 
did not react in any noticeable way to the officers' request to talk; he simply continued to 
his truck. (R. 197:33, 44, 53-54.) 
In the face of the overwhelming, clear, unequivocal testimony to the contrary, the 
court's determination that Fridleifson was hurried, nervous, or attempting to flee cannot 
be sustained. It is not supported by "substantial, competent evidence" of record. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 687 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the trial court's findings fail to recognize the following, relevant, 
uncontested facts: the officers did not observe Fridleifson make contact with anyone at 
the apartment; the officers had no information as to what Fridleifson may have discussed 
if he did make contact with an apartment resident; and the officers had no information to 
support that Fridleifson was involved in any way with drugs or drug trafficking. Indeed, 
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since the officers had no way to link Fridleifson with drugs or any particular activity at 
the apartment, the officers were acting on a mere hunch. 
In sum, the marshaled facts and inferences reflect that officers identified the 
apartment as a "drug house" because they believed individuals at the house were selling 
drugs. (R. 65, [^1; 197:5-6.) The officers first encountered Fridleifson when they were 
involved in arresting a person near the home. (R. 65,1fifl-2; 197:7-8, 23-25.) Officers 
told Fridleifson that if he was there to buy drugs, he should leave. (R. 66, f 3.) 
Fridleifson thanked the officers and left. (Id.) 
Later that evening, officers saw Fridleifson again in the area. He walked down the 
stairwell to the apartment, and after less than five minutes, he walked up and toward his 
truck. (See R. 66, Tfl[4-5; 197:8.) Officers did not have any information to support that 
Fridleifson was involved with drugs, they did not see Fridleifson make contact with 
anyone at the apartment, and they did not observe Fridleifson carry anything. (See R. 
197:26.) 
As Fridleifson walked to his truck, Larson and Washington asked if they could talk 
to him. Fridleifson did not respond. He did not increase his pace, he did not act nervous 
or jumpy, and he did not appear startled. (R. 197:53-54; see also 197:44.) 
According to the evidence, at some point en route to the truck, Fridleifson was 
walking toward Washington and Larson; he may have been in a position to see them. 
However, there is no evidence to support that he did see them, and no evidence to support 
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that he necessarily would have known who they were. According to the facts, it was 
dark, the officers wore jackets that may or may not have said "police" on the front, and 
Washington and Larson did not identify themselves. (See R. 197: 27-28, 42-43, 57-58.) 
Indeed, rather than identify themselves, Larson and Washington rushed up to 
Fridleifson. Larson grabbed Fridleifson and pushed him face-down against the truck. At 
that point, Fridleifson began to trash his elbows and he threw something that officers later 
retrieved and identified as a twist of cocaine. (R. 197:59-60.) 
The facts and inferences in this case fail to support reasonable suspicion for the 
seizure, as further set forth below. 
B. IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION. LARSON WAS 
REQUIRED TO ARTICULATE REASONABLE SUSPICION AS IT RELATED 
TO FRIDLEIFSON. 
Under a level-two encounter, an officer may detain a citizen and ask limited 
questions if the officer has a "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts," to support 
that "the individual is involved in criminal activity." State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718, 719 (1985)); see United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983); State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999) (officer must have reasonable suspicion to 
stop person in a public place and request name, address and explanation of actions). 
There is no bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable suspicion. Id. 
Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the 
circumstances." Id. (citations omitted). The "totality of the circumstances" 
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analysis must be based upon all the circumstances and must "raise a suspicion that 
the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (emphasis 
added). Put differently, the officers must have a "particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting criminal activity by the particular person detained." State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 
101 S.Ct. at 694-95). 
Steward. 806 P.2d at 215-16: see State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The "reasonable articulable suspicion" test requires the police officer "to point to 
'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 21); State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
1994) (reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts from the total 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop). The officer's subjective belief 
regarding the matter is irrelevant. Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1136-37 (an officer's state of mind 
is irrelevant); see State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Barnes. 
978 P.2d 1131,1135 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (officer's subjective belief is immaterial). 
"In the case before us, the trial court and both parties treated the matter as a level 
two encounter." Steward. 806 P.2d at 215. Where the trial court in this case ruled that 
Officers Larson and Washington had reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure, its ruling 
was in conflict with Utah and United States Supreme Court precedent. 
In State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, the police were executing search warrants for 
methamphetamine labs and controlled substances on three of six houses in a cul-de-sac 
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area. Officers found a functional lab and packages of marijuana in one house, chemicals 
for methamphetamine production in another house, and weapons in all three houses. Id. 
at 214. Officers were positioned near the entrance to the cul-de-sac to stop vehicles and 
to determine the destination of the occupants. If an individual indicated that his 
destination was one of the involved homes, officers detained that individual for further 
questioning. The officers were dressed in camouflage uniforms with patches and helmets 
which identified them as police. Id. 
During the police investigation of the area, defendant pulled up in a truck. 
Officers approached the vehicle and ordered him to stop. Defendant stopped and put his 
vehicle in reverse. An officer opened the driver's side door and again ordered defendant 
to stop. According to one officer, defendant "looked 'kind of panicky or startled."1 Id at 
214. When officers asked where defendant was going, he responded to visit a friend who 
lived in one of the suspect houses. Defendant was ordered out of his truck, at which time 
he was patted down and the truck was searched for weapons. Officers discovered bags of 
marijuana in an open gym bag in the truck. After defendant was arrested, the officers 
found more controlled substances and more than $5000 in cash. Id. at 214. The trial 
judge refused to suppress the evidence, and after a trial, which resulted in a conviction, 
defendant appealed. Id. at 215. 
This Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. It 
recognized that under the law, "the mere presence of a person in a neighborhood 
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frequented by drug users does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that such person is 
involved in criminal conduct." Id at 216 (citing Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47 (1979); 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (a slow moving car with 
out-of-state plates in a neighborhood where a number of burglaries occurred, without 
more, may not support reasonable suspicion)). Id. Likewise, an individual's presence in 
a high-crime area at a late hour will not support a reasonable suspicion that the individual 
is engaged in criminal activity. Id (citing Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85). 
In Steward, this Court was not persuaded that defendant's desire to engage in a late 
night association with a person in a drug house could support reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was involved in criminal activity. At the center of the matter was the fact that 
officers did not "observe[] Steward engage[] in any unlawful or suspicious activity." Id 
at 216. That is also at the center of Fridleifson's case. 
Here, although Officer Larson identified the residence in question as a "drug 
house," he did not have a search warrant to support or verify that claim. See Steward, 
806 P.2d at 214. In addition, officers did not testify that Fridleifson was nervous, 
"panicky or startled." Id In this case, Officer Larson testified that after the officers 
requested to speak with Fridleifson, he simply continued to his truck. He did not appear 
started, nervous or jumpy. (R. 197:53-54.) 
Fridleifson does not claim that the officers were required to ignore the fact that the 
residence under surveillance was a "known drug house." Those facts support the officers' 
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presence in the neighborhood. However, those facts do not support that Fridleifson was 
involved in wrongdoing. In that regard, the officers were entitled only to engage in a 
level-one encounter and Fridleifson was entitled to ignore the officers' requests and go on 
about his business. According to the law, the officers interfered with Fridleifson's 
constitutional rights when they grabbed him and pushed him against the truck. 
Next, in State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), several officers were 
attempting to obtain a search warrant and conducting surveillance of a trailer home for 
drug activity, when defendant drove up to and entered the home. Id. at 40-41. The 
defendant stayed inside the residence for about three minutes, then walked out and drove 
away. An officer subsequently stopped defendant's truck and recognized defendant as 
someone he knew. The officer was aware that defendant had been arrested previously on 
a drug crime and he believed defendant to be dangerous. The officer directed defendant 
and his passenger out of the car and had them empty their pockets. When defendant 
produced a weapon, the officer arrested him and searched him incident thereto. The 
officer discovered controlled substances. IdL at 41. Defendant was charged, and he 
moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search on the basis that the officer 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place. 
The trial court granted defendant's motion, and this Court upheld that ruling on 
appeal. This Court determined that the record failed to support a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was involved in criminal activity. IdL at 43. 
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< 
Again, that is the central issue in Fridleifson's case. The primary difference 
between the evidence here and the evidence in Potter is that officers observed Potter enter i 
the residence under surveillance, and they ultimately obtained a warrant to search that 
residence. Those facts do not exist in this case. Prior to the seizure, the officers had no 
information as to whether Fridleifson entered the residence or made contact with anyone 
at the apartment. Thus, the evidence in this case must be suppressed. 
( 
In State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, an officer was conducting surveillance on a house 
suspected of drug activity. During the surveillance, "defendant drove up, parked, and 
entered the house. Approximately three minutes later, defendant returned to her car and { 
drove off.11 Id. at 826. The officer followed the car, initiated a stop, and conducted a 
computer check where he discovered several warrants outstanding for the defendant's < 
arrest. The officer asked defendant to accompany him to his car where he questioned her 
about drug activity. During the questioning,ff[defendant denied having any knowledge 
i 
about narcotics trafficking at the home." Id. at 826. 
Defendant Sykes was arrested on the outstanding warrants, and the officer 
i 
searched her car, discovering a white powdery substance in a folded receipt under the 
front seat. Id. In the trial court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The trial 
court denied the motion, and this Court reversed the trial court's ruling on appeal. ( 
In reviewing the matter, this Court applied the totality of the circumstances 
analysis and recognized that "police officers, by virtue of their specialized experience, 
22 
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can sometimes recognize illegal activity where ordinary citizens would not." Id. at 827 
(citing State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 n.2 (Utah Ct. App), cert denied. 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987)); see also United States v. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. 744, 748-49 (2002). 
Under that analysis, there was no indication in the evidence of any wrongdoing on the 
part of defendant. Sykes, 840 P.2d at 828. 
At the time of the arrest, any connection between defendant and illegal 
activity was purely speculation. The police did not know the identity of either the 
owner or occupants of the house, and they did not know defendant. At that point, 
they had no positive evidence linking the house to illegal activity. Further, 
defendant's mere presence in an area suspected to harbor drug activity does not 
give rise to reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in such activity. Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Defendant's 
single visit does not link her to any drug dealers. She could have as easily been at 
( the house to visit someone who was not there, and so left quickly. In fact, Deputy 
Stephen's testimony indicates that defendant told him she was looking for her 
boyfriend. 
Sykes. 840 P.2d at 828-29 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Fridleifson's case, Fridleifson's trial counsel admitted that evidence of a "drug 
house" presented at the motion to suppress hearing was similar to evidence presented in 
Sykes. (See R. 197:75 (counsel did not dispute state's evidence of a "drug house"); 33, 
44-45 (counsel clarified earlier comments regarding the "drug house," stating that the 
facts in evidence here were similar to facts in Sykes, 840 P.2d at 828-29, where the court 
ruled that the officers "had no positive evidence linking the house to illegal activity").) 
Officers in Sykes and officers here suspected individuals in the residence were selling 
drugs. Notwithstanding the "drug house" label, the facts here are insufficient to establish 
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a link between Fridleifson and criminal activity. 
Indeed, the facts linking Fridleifson to such activity are more tenuous in this case ( 
than they were in Svkes. Larson admitted that he did not see Fridleifson talk to or make 
contact with anyone at the apartment, he did not see Fridleifson enter the residence, and 
he did not have information as to what Fridleifson may have discussed with anyone at the 
apartment. ,f[H]e could have easily been at the house to visit someone who was not 
there, and so left quickly." Sykes, 840 P.2d at 829. 
Likewise, the officers did not know Fridleifson, they did not observe him carry 
anything to or from the apartment, and they did not conduct any sort of computer check 
on Fridleifson's truck to determine if he had connections to drugs, or if the truck was 
registered to anyone with such connections. The record lacks objective particular facts to < 
support a reasonable suspicion that Fridleifson was involved in wrongdoing. The officers 
here seized Fridleifson based on a hunch. That was unconstitutional. 
< 
In Lemon v. State, 580 So.2d 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), an officer was 
patrolling a high crime area at night when he observed defendant driving slowly down the 
i 
street. Defendant stopped in front of an apartment complex known for drug activity, got 
out of his car and went inside. Defendant returned to his car a few minutes later and 
drove away. Id. at 293. The officer followed defendant and initiated a traffic stop when < 
he noticed a broken taillight on defendant's car. During the traffic stop, the officer 
engaged in a pat-down search and discovered a gun in defendant's jacket. The officer * 
24 
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arrested defendant for a firearms violation, and defendant subsequently moved to 
suppress the evidence on the basis that "entering a known 'drug hole' is not grounds for a 
stop." Id. at 293. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and he appealed. 
In analyzing the matter, the Florida Court of Appeals ruled that the circumstances 
in the case did not amount to "reasonable suspicion," but supported only a "bare suspi-
cion of illegal activity." Id. Those facts were insufficient to justify the stop. The remain-
ing analysis in the Florida case is not relevant to this matter, since the court then assessed 
the "pretextual" nature of the stop and the basis for the search under Florida law. 
Next, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure, when they 
observed defendant and another man walking away from one another in an alley which 
had a high incidence of drug trafficking. The officers in Brown did not know what, if 
anything, transpired between the men. See idL at 49. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled the evidence was insufficient to justify the 
intrusion by the officers, even for the limited purpose of determining why defendant was 
in the alley. The Court reiterated that in order for a seizure to be lawful, the officers must 
articulate "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved 
in criminal activity." Id. at 51. "The flaw in the State's case" was that officers failed to 
identify a basis for suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal conduct. IdL at 52. 
While the high incidence of drug trafficking in the area supported the desire to have a 
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1 
police presence, it did not support detaining and interfering with defendant. Id. 
In Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119 (2000)5 officers in a four-car caravan were < 
patrolling "an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking" in Chicago. They were investi-
gating drug transactions and expected to find crowds of people there to serve as "lookout" 
and to buy drugs. Id. at 121. As the last car in the caravan drove along West Van Buren, 
an officer "observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque 
bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled," running through "the 
gangway and an alley" before police cornered him. Id at 121-22. The officers 
discovered a handgun with ammunition in the bag and they arrested Wardlow. Id. 
On appeal, Wardlow challenged the basis for the stop. In reviewing the matter, the 
United States Supreme Court reiterated that an officer's reasonable suspicion must be { 
based on objective and particular facts. It also specified that "[a]n individual's presence 
in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a 
reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime." Id. at 124 
(citing Brown, 443 U.S. 47). While that fact is a "relevant contextual consideration" in 
the analysis, the officers' suspicions in Wardlow were aroused because of Wardlow's 
"unprovoked flight upon noticing the police." Id. at 124. 
The Court further reiterated that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or ' 
probable cause, approaches an individual, that individual has the right to ignore the 
officer and go on about his business. IcL at 125; Brown, 443 U.S. at 47 (recognizing 
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defendant has right to ignore officers). In that instance, 
[the individual's] "refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal 
level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. 
Bostick501U.S.429,437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). But 
unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very 
nature, is not "going about one's business"; in fact, it is just the opposite. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. In sum, a person's presence in an area of "heavy narcotics 
trafficking," without more, will not give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
Under Wardlow, the evidence here fails to support reasonable suspicion. 
While the "drug house" is a relevant consideration in the analysis, it is not enough 
to justify the seizure. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (individuals presence alone in a heavy 
narcotics area is not enough). That is, in order to justify the officers' conduct, the state 
was required to present additional, objective facts concerning Fridleifson ys involvement 
in criminal activity. In this case, the state failed to present such facts. 
First, Larson testified that when officers called out to Fridleifson after he came up 
the stairwell, Fridleifson was near the truck, it was dark, the officers were wearing jackets 
that may or may not have identified them as police, and they specifically did not identify 
themselves to Fridleifson. (See R. 66, TJ6.) Fridleifson did not respond to the officers. 
He continued to walk toward his truck. He did not appear jumpy, startled or nervous, and 
he did not change his manner. He simply continued about his business. (R. 197:53-54.) 
Fridleifson's conduct was appropriate under Wardlow. It did not give rise to 
reasonable articulable suspicion. Fridleifson was "going about his business," which he 
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was entitled to do. Any other conclusion would allow an officer to seize a person both 
when the officer observed that person in unprovoked flight (Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-
25), and when the officer observed that person going about his lawful business. The law 
does not allow a seizure under the latter scenario. 
Second, where the respondent in Wardlow was observed by officers to be in an 
"area known for heavy7 narcotics trafficking," id. at 121, the officers in this case were not 
in a position to observe whether Fridleifson went inside the "drug house" or made contact 
with anyone in the residence. (See R. 197:26.) That distinction further supports that the 
officers in Fridleifson's case did not have a sufficient basis to justify the seizure. 
Third, the additional facts and circumstances in this case do not tip the scales in 
favor of reasonable suspicion. Specifically, Fridleifson was in the area earlier that day. 
When he first arrived, officers were involved in arresting a person who apparently had 
been in the apartment. The officers told Fridleifson that if he was there to buy drugs he 
should leave. The officers' conduct and their statements would have communicated to 
Fridleifson that they were involved in an investigation relating to the apartment. A 
reasonable person would have thanked the officers and left to allow them to complete 
their investigation. That evidence does not support reasonable suspicion. It does not 
suggest that Fridleifson was a frequent short-term visitor of the apartment, and it does not 
support flight or evasive conduct on his part. Rather, the additional and total 
circumstances reflect the opposite. 
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Once a reasonable amount of time elapsed for the officers to complete their 
business at the apartment, Fridleifson returned. That does not suggest criminal activity on 
Fridleifson's part since the officers dissuaded Fridleifson from going to the door the first 
time he was there. The officers did not see Fridleifson enter the apartment or make 
contact with anyone at the apartment. They had no basis for suspecting criminal conduct 
on Fridleifson's part. 
In short, the officers here were acting on a hunch. They had no information to 
suggest that Fridleifson used drugs or was a frequent short-term visitor of the residence. 
There was no evidence to support that officers observed anything unusual about 
Fridleifson's behavior as he approached or left the apartment. There was no evidence to 
support that Fridleifson was carrying anything from the apartment of a suspicious nature. 
There was no evidence that Fridleifson tried to evade the officers. There was no evidence 
linking Fridleifson to any criminal activity, whether the activity related to the apartment 
or otherwise. 
In this matter, officers were entitled only to approach Fridleifson and to ask if he 
would talk to them. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18 (during a level-one encounter an 
officer may approach a citizen and ask questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will). When Fridleifson ignored the officers, they were not entitled to grab, 
seize or detain him. The facts in this case fail to support reasonable suspicion for the 
level-two detention. 
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Utah courts have repeatedly ruled that evidence discovered under similar 
circumstances must be suppressed. Steward. 806 P.2d at 216 (ruling that motion to 
suppress evidence should have been granted); Sykes, 840 P.2d at 829; Potter. 863 P.2d at 
44 (affirming trial court's suppression of the evidence). In this case, Fridleifson is 
entitled to have the evidence discovered by officers in connection with the unlawful 
seizure suppressed. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688-89 (police illegality will poison the 
evidence). 
C. IN CONNECTION WITH REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. FRIDLEIFSON IS ENTITLED TO AN 
ORDER DISMISSING THE CHARGE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE. HE IS 
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ABSENT THE UNLAWFULLY SEIZED 
EVIDENCE. 
In the event the cocaine is suppressed as a result of the unlawful level-two 
detention, Fridleifson may be entitled to the entry of an order dismissing the possession 
charge for insufficient evidence. In the alternative, Fridleifson is entitled to a new trial, 
absent the evidence relating to the unlawful seizure. 
In considering prejudice, this Court will review the state's trial evidence, absent 
the evidence relating to the unlawful seizure, to determine whether there is a likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for Fridleifson. See State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 407 
(Utah 1989) (if, in the absence of the evidentiary error, there is a likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the defendant, "we must reverse the conviction"); State v. Mitchell 
779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (in assessing prejudice, this Court will consider the case 
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absent the evidence that was wrongfully admitted). Stated another way, this Court will 
assess that which is left of the state's evidence to support a conviction for drug possession 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998). 
In this matter, after the trial judge ruled on the motion to suppress, the state 
presented its case to a jury. Pursuant to Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), the state was required to 
establish the following to support the possession charge: f,[t]hat on or about the 11th day 
of January, 1999, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Gerald D. Fridleifson, 
possessed Cocaine." (See R. 141); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998). The trial 
judge instructed the jury that possession was defined as follows: "to have physical 
possession of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible property, in this case 
Cocaine." (R. 143.) 
At trial, the state presented evidence of the cocaine twist that officers recovered on 
January 11 during the unlawful seizure. (SeeR. 195:4-5,27-28, 113-114, 116-17, 126-
130.) The remaining evidence from the state consisted of testimony from Washington 
and Larson that they watched the suspect house on occasion and arrested suspects, and 
they observed Fridleifson in the area during their surveillance on January 11, 1999. (R. 
195:14-149.) The only evidence presented by the state to support drug possession as it 
related to Fridleifson was the unlawfully seized cocaine. 
The state did not present other evidence to support that Fridleifson was in 
possession of an illegal substance; the state did not present other evidence to support that 
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i 
Fridleifson exercised dominion or control over an illegal substance; and the state did not 
present evidence to support that Fridleifson made any contact with any person at the i 
"known drug house" for the purpose of possessing drugs. (See R. 195, in general.) 
The state presented no other evidence to support "possession" as charged. (See R. < 
195,196.) Indeed, Officer Washington admitted that the officers did not observe 
Fridleifson engage in unlawful activity on January 11, 1999. (R. 195:53.) 
Fridleifson has established harm in this case. He was prejudiced by the state's 
presentation of the unlawfully seized evidence at trial. If the substance discovered in 
< 
connection with the illegal seizure had been suppressed, the result in this case would have 
been more favorable to Fridleifson. He would have been acquitted of the charge. 
See Mitchell. 779 P.2d at 1122. This case should be remanded for dismissal of the < 
charge, or in the alternative, for a new trial without the unlawfully seized evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
i 
For the reasons set forth herein, Fridleifson respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, and remand this case to the trial 
court for dismissal of the charge or a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 2^day of W A ^ L , 2002. • 
( / 
jAnd*. 7^i fyh. -
LBtfDAM. JONES fw 
OTIS STERLING, III 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant < 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
GERALD DOUG FRIDLEIFSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991903218 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: April 13, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STERLING, OTIS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 10, 1948 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/13/01 Tape Count: 11:51/12:03 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/12/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
J. ./. JD~ . > ., A . / Page/1 
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Case No: 991903218 
Date: Apr 13, 2001 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $5000.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $5000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 6 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by THIRD DISTRICT COURT DIV. II 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
Court supervised probation for 6 months. 
Serve 6 months in the Salt Lake County J^il new^time, No early 
release. Commitment forthwith / >T • \ *. " >>. 
Dated this f2> day of d^lKJ^O / 2 0 ^ . ^ ^ , ^ 
?IMOTHY::R. HANSON 
r
 D i s t r i c tv" Court
 r Judge 
Paqe 2 (last) 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
77-7-15, Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD D. FRIDLEIFSON, 
Defendant. 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence Seized Illegally. A hearing was held on this matter on 
May 17, 1999/ at which time counsel for defendant and counsel for 
the State presented their respective positions. Following oral 
argument, the Court granted leave to the State to file a 
supplemental memorandum regarding the limited issue of whether 
State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1992), applies to the 
present case. The Court then took the matter under advisement to 
further consider the written submissions. 
The State filed a Bench Memorandum regarding Svkes on June 9, 
1999. The defendant did not file a response to the Bench 
Memorandum. Since having taken the defendant's Motion under 
CASE NO. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
«Tn«JT w s s s 
iicia! District 
JUL 2 1 E29 
"LAKE.COUNTY 
-5Sputy~C!erk 
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STATE F. FRIDLEIFSON PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to once again review 
the moving and responding legal Memoranda, as well as the Bench 
Memorandum. Being otherwise fully advised, the Court enters the 
following Memorandum Decision.
 { 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The relevant facts established during the suppression hearing 
are as follows. On January 11, 1999, Officer Matt Larson observed { 
the defendant at an apartment located at 350 South Post Street. 
Counsel for both the State and the defendant stipulated during the 
hearing that the apartment was a known drug house. 
Officer Larson first observed the defendant at the apartment 
just after he arrested another individual at the apartment for 
possession of drugs. At that time, Officer Larson informed the 
defendant that if he intended to buy drugs at the apartment, then 
he should leave. The defendant remarked "thanks" and proceeded to 
leave the apartment. 
Some time later, while Officer Larson was watching the 
apartment from a concealed position, he again observed the 
defendant enter the apartment and, after approximately five 
minutes, leave the apartment. At that point, Officer Larson, with 
the assistance of other officers, approached the defendant and < 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE F. FRIDLEIFSON PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
called out to him. The defendant did not stop, but rather 
continued to walk towards the driver's side of his truck in a rapid 
pace. The defendant was apprehended and arrested. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Counsel has stipulated that a level two encounter occurred in 
this case, requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the defendant has been or is about to be 
engaged in illegal conduct. Svkes, 840 P.2d at 827; See also, Utah 
Code Annotated §77-7-15. The Court therefore considers whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Larson had a 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had engaged in affirmative 
conduct indicating criminal activity, justifying his investigatory 
stop. 
The defendant argues that the circumstances in this case are 
analogous to those in Svkes, where the Utah Court of Appeals held 
that the officer had no reasonable articulable suspicion to 
justify stopping Sykes. In that case, Deputy Keith Stephens was 
conducting surveillance of a house that was suspected of being a 
drug house. When he observed Sykes enter the house and leave after 
only three minutes, Deputy Stephens decided to follow her in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
STATE F. FRIDLEIFSON PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
his car. After some distance, Sykes pulled over and Deputy 
Stephens approached her. A warrants check on Sykes revealed that 
she had several outstanding warrants. Deputy Stephens questioned 
Sykes about her drug activity at the house she had just left and 
then proceeded to arrest her for the outstanding warrants. 
In determining that Deputy Stephens had no reasonable 
suspicion that Sykes was engaged in criminal activity, the court 
indicated that Sykes' "mere presence in an area suspected to harbor 
drug activity does not give rise to reasonable suspicion . . . . 
She could have easily been at the house to visit someone who was 
not there, and so left quickly." Id. (emphasis added). The court 
emphasized that the police officers "had no positive evidence 
linking the house to illegal activity." Id. at 828-29. Finding 
that any connection between Sykes and illegal activity was purely 
speculation, the court concluded that Sykes' detention was 
unconstitutional. 
The defendant in this case argues that like Sykes, he was 
stopped only because he exited a suspected drug house. Were this 
actually the case, the Court might agree that there was 
insufficient basis to justify Officer Larson's stop. However, the 
record indicates that Officer Larson's decision to stop the 
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STATE F. FRIDLEIFSON PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
defendant was based on more than the defendant's mere presence at 
a suspected drug house. Instead, unlike Svkes, the defendant left 
a house which the parties have stipulated to have been identified 
as a drug house. The court in Svkes made it clear that the house 
from which Sykes exited was merely a reputed distribution point for 
drugs. Further, distinguishable from Svkes, the defendant's 
conduct was itself suspicious. The defendant was first observed at 
the house with another individual who was subsequently arrested for 
drug possession. On that occasion, when Officer Larson told the 
defendant to leave if he was there to buy drugs, the defendant 
responded by thanking the officer and leaving, all indicative that 
the defendant was indeed there to purchase drugs. Further, the 
defendant's action of going back to the house a second time for 
only a brief period conformed to the patterns of a drug purchase. 
Finally, the defendant left the drug house in a hurried manner and, 
when the police officers called out to him, exhibited nervous 
behavior and apparently attempted to flee to his truck. The Court 
finds these facts, taken altogether, constitute a sufficient basis 
for reasonably suspecting that the defendant was involved in 
criminal activity. Accordingly, the defendant's detention was not 
violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
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STATE F. FRIDLEIFSON PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Constitution. The Court therefore denies the defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order consistent with 
this Memorandum Decision and submit /the same to the Court for 
review and signature. / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this, day of 
July, 1999: 
Lana Taylor 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Lower Level 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Otis Sterling, III 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-7874 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. x 
GERALD D. FRIDLEIFSON, ) Case No. 991903218 FS 
Defendant. ) Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER, HAVING COME BEFORE THE COURT for an 
Evidentiary Hearing for the Defendant's Motion to Suppress on May 17, 1999, at 2:00 p.m. The 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Defendant was present and represented by Otis 
Sterling of the Legal Defenders Association. The State was represented by Lana Taylor, Deputy 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County. Based upon the testimony, arguments of counsel and 
evidence presented at the hearing, and for good cause shown, the Court now makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 11,1999, Salt Lake City Police Officer Matt Larson, saw the 
Defendant behind an apartment, known to law enforcement as a "known drug house." 
2. On that date, the Defendant was present when Officer Larson arrested an individual 
inside the apartment for a drug offense. 
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3. Officer Larson told the Defendant that he should leave if he was there to buy 
drugs. The Defendant thanked Officer Larson and left. 
4. Later that same day, Officer Larson saw the Defendant park his truck down the 
street and walk down the stairs to the same apartment. 
5. After five minutes the Defendant walked back up the stairs and started back to his ( 
truck. 
6. Officer Larson and Officer Washington then approached the Defendant from the 
front, dressed in bright yellow jackets, and told him to stop. 
7. The Defendant did not stop, but continued towards his truck at a rapid pace. 
8. The Officers then stopped the Defendant, who threw an object into the air, , 
which later turned out to be a twist of cocaine. 
FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Larson had reasonable articulable 
suspicion, based upon objective facts, that the Defendant was engaged in unlawful drug activity 
when he stopped the Defendant. 
2. Officer Larson effectuated a lawful Level II detention of the Defendant that did 
not violate his rights under either the United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution. 
3. Officer Larson did not exceed the scope of the stop because he had probable cause 
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to effectuate an arrest after the Defendant threw the twist of cocaine into the air. 
DATED this / f day of 61o<&Lu<i±-, 1 
BY THE COURT 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON , 
f
 District Couit^udge . .»' , \ 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-7874 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD D. FRIDLEIFSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 991903218 FS 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Based on the Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally is denied. 
DATED this /4 day of (^6ufiM*t~ , 1999 J 
IMOTHy-R. ^ HANSON \ 
District Court Judge*; ; 
V- ; « "»-*-• ..." ' 
H 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order to Otis Sterling, attorney for the defendant, at the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
DATED this, )^~day of August, 1999. 
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